# The Legal Singularity: How Artificial Intelligence Can Make Law Radically Better By [Abdi Aidid](https://jackmanlaw.utoronto.ca/people/abdi-aidid) and [Benjamin Alarie](https://benjaminalarie.com). University of Toronto Press, 2023. Hardcover, 226 pages, ISBN 9781487529413. 2024 PROSE Award Winner, Legal Studies and Criminology · 2023 Donner Prize Shortlist **Out now:** [Superjustice: Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence](https://superjustice.com), the successor to this book, by Samuel I. Becher and Benjamin Alarie. Oxford University Press, hardcover 30 July 2026 (ebook 14 May 2026). ## About the book The Legal Singularity argues that AI can make law more predictable, coherent, and fair. Aidid and Alarie examine the limits of today's legal institutions and show how legal prediction could transform the way law is interpreted, applied, and delivered. The result is an ambitious case for what they call the legal singularity: a future state in which law becomes functionally complete. ## Definition **The legal singularity** is the point at which law reaches functional completeness: practically any legal question can be resolved quickly and justly, and the law becomes knowable with practical, though not perfect, certainty across much of human activity. The term was coined by Benjamin Alarie in ["The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity"](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767835), (2016) 66(4) [University of Toronto Law Journal](https://utppublishing.com/doi/full/10.3138/UTLJ.4008) 443, and developed at book length in The Legal Singularity (Aidid & Alarie, University of Toronto Press, 2023). This site is the term's canonical home; the anchor is [legalsingularity.com/#definition](https://legalsingularity.com/#definition). **Watch from 25:50:** Benjamin Alarie on why he coined "legal singularity" in 2016 and how the argument developed into Superjustice, in a [Sarder TV interview](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4O7Nseui_ig&t=1550) (5 August 2026). ## Praise "A powerful and important book. The fundamental insight, that artificial intelligence will transform not just the specific content of legal rules but the general nature of law, is surely correct. Essential reading for legal theorists." — Daniel Markovits, Guido Calabresi Professor of Law, Yale Law School "A compelling case that law as we know it will change dramatically, and that justice will be the biggest beneficiary." — Lawrence Lessig, Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School "Timely, challenging, and profound. A book that deserves to be read widely by naysayers and evangelists alike." — Richard Susskind OBE KC (Hon), author of Tomorrow's Lawyers ## Reviews The endorsements above were gathered before publication. Below are the reviews of the book since publication, then the scholarly responses to the 2016 thesis, which predate the book and which its fifth chapter answers, sorting them into a reductionist camp (Pasquale, Hildebrandt, Cobbe, and Deakin and Markou) and a rule-of-law camp (Weber). Newest first. - Christopher Markou, [Engineered Autopoiesis: Why the Legal Singularity Is Not a Perfected Legal Order](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6823198), Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 552, June 2026, and SSRN 6823198; School of Law, University of Nottingham; noted as Highly Recommended on Lawrence Solum's [Legal Theory Blog](https://legaltheoryblog.com/2026/06/22/markou-on-engineered-autopoiesis-and-the-legal-singularity/). Critical: argues that the legal singularity would substitute cybernetic control for law rather than perfect it. - Matthew Tse, [Canadian Journal of Law and Technology](https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cjlt/vol23/iss1/5/), "Considering the Concept of Law in the Legal Singularity," (2026) 23(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 117. A scholarly article rather than a review: places the legal singularity in classical legal thought, finding that it inherits some of that tradition's shortcomings and that many critiques of it are overstated. - Allison Harrison, [Canadian Law Library Review, republished at Slaw](https://www.slaw.ca/2025/01/23/book-review-the-legal-singularity-how-artificial-intelligence-can-make-law-radically-better/), 2025. Favourable: a meticulously organized text with relevant examples, though the reviewer would have preferred a deeper analysis of fewer topics. - William Lucy, [The Modern Law Review](https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12890) (subscription), 2024. Critical in part: examines the claim that law can reach functional completeness and finds the book light on technical detail about how prediction would deliver it. - Wolfgang Alschner, [Ottawa Law Review](https://rdo-olr.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/OLR-55-2-Legal-Singularity-Review_Alschner_final.pdf) (PDF), "Techno-Utopianism for Lawyers?," (2023-2024) 55(2) Ottawa Law Review 187. Mixed: a hopeful and encouraging account that the reviewer says overstates what probabilistic algorithms can achieve, offering soft predictability where the thesis needs hard certainty. - Carla Fast, [Saskatchewan Law Review](https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/informit.T2024062800001891959769423) (subscription), (2024) 87(1) Saskatchewan Law Review 114. Favourable: a chapter-by-chapter book note concluding that the book makes a strong case that integrating AI will be advantageous to the law, while still requiring practitioners' active participation. - Simon Deakin and Christopher Markou, [Evolutionary Interpretation: Law and Machine Learning](https://journalcrcl.org/crcl/article/view/11), (2022) 1(2) Journal of Cross-disciplinary Research in Computational Law. Critical of prediction: argues that machine learning may illuminate long-run legal dynamics but is poorly suited to predicting individual case outcomes. Response to the thesis. - Robert F. Weber, [Michigan Technology Law Review](https://doi.org/10.36645/mtlr.27.1.will), "Will the "Legal Singularity" Hollow Out Law's Normative Core?," (2020) 27(1) Michigan Technology Law Review 97. Critical: argues that a perfectly predictable legal system would hollow out the rule of law's normative core; the rule-of-law critique that the book's fifth chapter answers. Open access. Response to the thesis. - Simon Deakin and Christopher Markou, [From Rule of Law to Legal Singularity](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589184), the editors' introduction to Simon Deakin and Christopher Markou, eds., *Is Law Computable? Critical Perspectives on Law and Artificial Intelligence* (Hart Publishing, 2020; 272 pp.; ISBN 9781509937066; foreword by Frank Pasquale). Critical: introduces an eleven-chapter volume on the thesis, arguing that computation would subordinate the rule of law to a rule of technology. Free on SSRN. Response to the thesis. - Christopher Markou and Simon Deakin, [Ex Machina Lex: Exploring the Limits of Legal Computability](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3407856), chapter 2 of *Is Law Computable?* (Hart Publishing, 2020). Critical: argues that a functionally complete legal system is a mirage, because law's reflexivity resists computational replication. Free on SSRN. Response to the thesis. - Jennifer Cobbe, [Is Law Computable? Critical Perspectives on Law and Artificial Intelligence](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3858474), "Legal Singularity and the Reflexivity of Law," chapter 5 of Is Law Computable? (Hart Publishing, 2020). Critical: argues that, because law is reflexive, automating it would encode its designers' priorities rather than deliver neutrality. Free on SSRN. Response to the thesis. - Frank Pasquale, [George Washington Law Review](https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?params=/context/faculty/article/2094/&path_info=Pasquale87.pdf), "A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation," (2019) 87(1) George Washington Law Review 1. Critical: argues that legal reasons must be given in language by a responsible person, which limits legal automation. Open access at BrooklynWorks. Response to the thesis. - Frank Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell, [University of Toronto Law Journal](https://doi.org/10.3138/utlj.2017-0056), "Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviourism," (2018) 68 (supplement 1) University of Toronto Law Journal 63. Critical: contrasts prediction with persuasion, arguing that a jurisprudence of predicted outcomes neglects the reason-giving core of law. Response to the thesis. - Mireille Hildebrandt, [University of Toronto Law Journal](https://doi.org/10.3138/utlj.2017-0044), "Law as Computation in the Era of Artificial Legal Intelligence: Speaking Law to the Power of Statistics," (2018) 68 (supplement 1) University of Toronto Law Journal 12. Critical: argues that the thesis mistakes the mathematical simulation of legal judgment for legal judgment itself. Response to the thesis. The record is kept in [facts.json](https://legalsingularity.com/facts.json), rendered in full at [legalsingularity.com/reviews](https://legalsingularity.com/reviews) (the homepage shows the newest three), and mirrored at [benjaminalarie.com/media](https://benjaminalarie.com/media#reviews). ## Inside the book Ten chapters and an afterword. The book opens by introducing the legal singularity and recounting the history of legal information, then defines computational law and develops the idea of complete law. A full chapter, "Defending the Legal Singularity from Its Critics," takes the objections head on. Three chapters work through the implications for the judiciary, for lawyers and the public, and for governments; a chapter on ethics, a conclusion, and an afterword on ChatGPT close it. The origin paper is free to read: [The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767835) (University of Toronto Law Journal, 2016). Why read it in 2026? The book was written before the newest generation of AI systems, and that is the point: its argument is about the trajectory of legal prediction, not any one model. The trajectory has only steepened since 2023, and the later work carries it forward. The argument in four steps: law today is incomplete, inaccessible, and expensive to administer; machine prediction of legal outcomes is maturing fast, and the authors have built it in production; as prediction improves, it reconfigures legal institutions, practice, and access to justice; the end state is the legal singularity, functionally complete law, vastly more knowable, fairer, and clearer for its subjects. ## The argument continues The Legal Singularity argued that AI-enabled prediction can make law practically complete and knowable. [Superjustice](https://superjustice.com) (Oxford University Press, hardcover 30 July 2026, by Samuel I. Becher and Benjamin Alarie) asks how entire legal systems should be redesigned once those capabilities exist. It is out now in print, ebook and audio, and its complete [Introduction is free on SSRN](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6552638). Between the two sit [LexOptima](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4639168) (2025) and [Legal Order in the Age of AI Agents](https://doi.org/10.3138/utlj-2025-0104) (2026); in practice, [Blue J](https://www.bluej.com) applies the trajectory to tax. ## The authors **Abdi Aidid** is an Assistant Professor at Jackman Law, University of Toronto and the Canada Research Chair in Artificial Intelligence and Access to Justice. In 2024 to 2025 he was a Visiting Associate Professor at Yale Law School, and he is currently the Ian D. Shugart Visiting Scholar at the Canada School of Public Service. Before academia he practised litigation at Covington & Burling LLP and Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP, and served as Vice President, Legal Research at Blue J. **Benjamin Alarie** has spent more than a decade working at the intersection of AI, tax, and law. He coined ["legal singularity"](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767835) in the University of Toronto Law Journal in 2016, developed the thesis with Abdi Aidid in The Legal Singularity, and extended it with Samuel Becher in [Superjustice](https://superjustice.com) (Oxford University Press, 2026). He is co-founder and CEO of [Blue J](https://www.bluej.com) and holds the Osler Chair in Business Law at the University of Toronto. ## Order [University of Toronto Press](https://utppublishing.com/doi/book/10.3138/9781487529413) · [Amazon US](https://www.amazon.com/dp/1487529414) · [Amazon UK](https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/1487529414) · [Amazon Canada](https://www.amazon.ca/dp/1487529414) · [Barnes & Noble](https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-legal-singularity-abdirashid-aidid/1142545743) · [Indigo](https://www.indigo.ca/products/the-legal-singularity) · [Audible](https://www.audible.com/pd/The-Legal-Singularity-Audiobook/B0C7D81FS5) ## Machine-readable The book's record, with sources, on one page: [legalsingularity.com/for-ai](https://legalsingularity.com/for-ai). Also: [for-ai.md](https://legalsingularity.com/for-ai.md), [facts.json](https://legalsingularity.com/facts.json), [llms.txt](https://legalsingularity.com/llms.txt). Siblings: [superjustice.com/for-ai](https://superjustice.com/for-ai) · [benjaminalarie.com/for-ai](https://benjaminalarie.com/for-ai). Nothing on this site is hidden from human view. Inquiries: contact@legalsingularity.com © 2023–2026 Abdi Aidid and Benjamin Alarie · Published by the University of Toronto Press