In Review
Independent reviews and responses.
The reviews of the book and the responses to it since publication, newest first, then the scholarly responses to the 2016 thesis, which predate the book and which its fifth chapter answers, sorting them into a reductionist camp (Pasquale, Hildebrandt, Cobbe, and Deakin and Markou) and a rule-of-law camp (Weber). The endorsements on the homepage were gathered before publication. New reviews are added as they appear; each entry is dated by its year and linked to its source.
Reviews of the book, and responses to it
-
2026
SSRN Christopher Markou, “Engineered Autopoiesis: Why the Legal Singularity Is Not a Perfected Legal Order,” Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 552, June 2026, and SSRN 6823198; School of Law, University of Nottingham; noted as Highly Recommended on Lawrence Solum’s Legal Theory Blog. Critical: argues that the legal singularity would substitute cybernetic control for law rather than perfect it. Response
-
2026
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology Matthew Tse, “Considering the Concept of Law in the Legal Singularity,” (2026) 23(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 117. A scholarly article rather than a review: places the legal singularity in classical legal thought, finding that it inherits some of that tradition’s shortcomings and that many critiques of it are overstated. Response
-
2025
Canadian Law Library Review, republished at Slaw Allison Harrison. Favourable: a meticulously organized text with relevant examples, though the reviewer would have preferred a deeper analysis of fewer topics.
-
2024
The Modern Law Review William Lucy. Critical in part: examines the claim that law can reach functional completeness and finds the book light on technical detail about how prediction would deliver it. Subscription
-
2024
Ottawa Law Review Wolfgang Alschner, “Techno-Utopianism for Lawyers?,” (2023–2024) 55(2) Ottawa Law Review 187. Mixed: a hopeful and encouraging account that the reviewer says overstates what probabilistic algorithms can achieve, offering soft predictability where the thesis needs hard certainty. PDF
-
2024
Saskatchewan Law Review Carla Fast, (2024) 87(1) Saskatchewan Law Review 114. Favourable: a chapter-by-chapter book note concluding that the book makes a strong case that integrating AI will be advantageous to the law, while still requiring practitioners’ active participation. Subscription
Responses to the 2016 thesis
-
2022
Journal of Cross-disciplinary Research in Computational Law Simon Deakin and Christopher Markou, “Evolutionary Interpretation: Law and Machine Learning,” (2022) 1(2) Journal of Cross-disciplinary Research in Computational Law. Critical of prediction: argues that machine learning may illuminate long-run legal dynamics but is poorly suited to predicting individual case outcomes. Response
-
2020
Michigan Technology Law Review Robert F. Weber, “Will the ‘Legal Singularity’ Hollow Out Law’s Normative Core?,” (2020) 27(1) Michigan Technology Law Review 97. Critical: argues that a perfectly predictable legal system would hollow out the rule of law’s normative core; the rule-of-law critique that the book’s fifth chapter answers. Open access. Response
-
2020
Is Law Computable? Critical Perspectives on Law and Artificial Intelligence Simon Deakin and Christopher Markou, “From Rule of Law to Legal Singularity,” the editors’ introduction to Is Law Computable? (Hart Publishing, 2020; 272 pp.; ISBN 9781509937066; foreword by Frank Pasquale). Critical: introduces an eleven-chapter volume on the thesis, arguing that computation would subordinate the rule of law to a rule of technology. Free on SSRN. Response
-
2020
Is Law Computable? Critical Perspectives on Law and Artificial Intelligence Christopher Markou and Simon Deakin, “Ex Machina Lex: Exploring the Limits of Legal Computability,” chapter 2 of Is Law Computable? (Hart Publishing, 2020). Critical: argues that a functionally complete legal system is a mirage, because law’s reflexivity resists computational replication. Free on SSRN. Response
-
2020
Is Law Computable? Critical Perspectives on Law and Artificial Intelligence Jennifer Cobbe, “Legal Singularity and the Reflexivity of Law,” chapter 5 of Is Law Computable? (Hart Publishing, 2020). Critical: argues that, because law is reflexive, automating it would encode its designers’ priorities rather than deliver neutrality. Free on SSRN. Response
-
2019
George Washington Law Review Frank Pasquale, “A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation,” (2019) 87(1) George Washington Law Review 1. Critical: argues that legal reasons must be given in language by a responsible person, which limits legal automation. Open access at BrooklynWorks. Response
-
2018
University of Toronto Law Journal Frank Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell, “Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviourism,” (2018) 68 (supplement 1) University of Toronto Law Journal 63. Critical: contrasts prediction with persuasion, arguing that a jurisprudence of predicted outcomes neglects the reason-giving core of law. Response
-
2018
University of Toronto Law Journal Mireille Hildebrandt, “Law as Computation in the Era of Artificial Legal Intelligence: Speaking Law to the Power of Statistics,” (2018) 68 (supplement 1) University of Toronto Law Journal 12. Critical: argues that the thesis mistakes the mathematical simulation of legal judgment for legal judgment itself. Response
The record is kept in this site’s facts.json and mirrored at benjaminalarie.com/media. A review not listed here can be sent to the authors at contact@legalsingularity.com.
← The Legal Singularity: the book, its authors, and where to order it